股权质押作为一种新型融资手段的同时也引发了大股东通过高溢价并购、盲目扩大投资规模以及关联交易等方式进行掏空，造成了企业的非效率投资。本文以2010-2019年中国沪深A股上市公司数据为样本，分析了分析师关注视角下股权质押与投资效率之间的关系。结果发现：进行了股权质押的公司，对投资效率有显著的负向影响，分析师关注制约了大股东股权质押之后的掏空动机，其显著弱化了股权质押带来的非效率投资问题。

As a new type of financing method, equity pledge also caused major shareholders to hollow out through high-premium mergers and acquisitions, blindly expanding the scale of investment, and related transactions, resulting in inefficient investment of enterprises. This article uses the data of China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2019 as a sample to analyze the relationship between equity pledge and investment efficiency from the perspective of analysts' attention. The results found that: companies that have pledged equity have a significant negative impact on investment efficiency. Analysts are concerned about the motive of tunneling that restricts major shareholders’ equity pledges, which significantly weakens the problem of inefficient investment caused by equity pledges.